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Book Note
INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITY AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO
PROTECT, by Anne Orford'
AARON SIGAL
IN DELVING INTO ANNE ORFORD'S TREATISE on the responsibility to protect
doctrine ("R2P"), International Authority and the Responsibility to Protect, it was
impossible not to be struck by the rare confluence of theory and history. As
Orford's analysis of R2P's theoretical underpinnings was released in early 2011,
news coverage testified to the Arab Spring's blossoming; in the process, the West
again became ensnared in debates over intervention, isolation, and universal
moral responsibilities. While this culminated in a United Nations-sanctioned
military intervention into Libya, with R2P principles cited as justification, the
Arab political earthquake again brought the policy's existential problems into
sharp focus. This book revisits many of these issues-such as how to recognize the
legitimate bearer of state authority or what threshold of harm must be breached-
and ultimately criticizes the doctrine's origins and development.
While Orford concludes her entire discussion by describing her eschewal
of the increasingly pessimistic response to R2P in favour of a more optimistic
view, it is evident throughout that the doctrine has emerged from a controversial
philosophical foundation. Divided into five lengthy chapters, the book canvasses
the legal and political bases for the modern commitment to R2P as well as the
history of its practical implementation. Although the doctrine has been debated
since the exposure of the Holocaust, Orford focuses on international interference
in the decolonization period in Africa and in the Balkans through the UN
structure.
Chapter one describes the normative shift in the international arena in favour
of R2P, championed by the Western bloc against a more wary post-colonial and
non-aligned faction. Orford uses this section to explain the United Nations'
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increasingly centralized and autonomous executive branch, led by the Secretary
General's office, while chapter two furthers this in providing a historical review
of international executive rule. In this second part, Orford reflects specifically on
two contrasting case studies-the United Nations' heralded 1956 intervention in
the Suez Canal crisis and its maligned 1960 campaign into the post-Belgian civil
strife and Katangese succession crisis in the Congo-to explore the expansion
of executive authority within R2P. She argues that R2P and the augmentation
of UN executive rule was spearheaded by the organization's second secretary
general, Dag Hammarskj6ld, and consolidated around his three fundamental
pillars of independent executive action, total neutrality and impartiality, and
host-state consent. However, although Hammarskj6ld was confident that these
principles could coexist with intervention in complex enduring conflicts, Orford
states that it eventually became clear from the Congo exercise and the United
Nations' later paralysis in East Timor, Rwanda, Srebrenica, and Kosovo that
R2P's core neutrality objective would be inherently impossible to sustain.
The book's remaining sections are devoted to an analysis of R2P's philosophical
and legal groundwork. In chapter three, Orford connects the international arena's
unilateral authority to intercede where the protection of citizens has collapsed to
two foundational conservative European state theorists: Thomas Hobbes and the
neo-Hobbesian Carl Schmitt. Writing from the governmental chaos surrounding
the English Civil War and Weimar Germany, respectively, Hobbes and Schmitt
both preached that state authority does not flow from the origin of the sovereign's
power, but from the keystone ability to protect, stabilize, and unify the citizenry.
Describing R2P as evolving from this attitude, "much of Orford's criticism stems
from its perceived absolutist tendencies, especially when combined with a more
centralized international executive authority.
Lastly, chapters four and five express the remaining concerns over R2P's
grand questions, such as who has the authority to decide when protection within
a sovereign country has crumbled, which parties to collaborate with in complex
conflicts, and what level of control the international community should annex
to itself and for how long. While Orford ultimately views the international
authority to protect as a function of the United Nations Secretariat rather than
NATO, the Bretton Woods institutions, or individual state actors, it is clear that
these questions remain unresolved. And in the end, as the community of nations
struggles with these concerns while simultaneously implementing the doctrine
in conflict zones like Libya, these uncertainties may injure the credibility of the
program.
